Variation in delegation size in multilateral diplomacy
Open Access
- 8 February 2019
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in The British Journal of Politics and International Relations
- Vol. 21 (2) , 421-438
Abstract
Why do some countries send big delegations to multilateral negotiations, whereas others send very small ones? This article looks at both the causes of variation in state delegations to multilateral conferences but also at the consequences of such variation at both micro- and macro-level. It tests the arguments derived from liberal theory of international regimes, using the case of the NPT Review Process. The results suggest that economic and security interests drive states’ participation in the multilateral settings; normative concerns about global public goods matter less. The article also argues that while countries which are more abundantly present in the negotiations do not tend to get more from international organisations; countries which have been less present during the negotiations tended to be more interested in alternative forum shopping in the form of ‘nuclear ban treaty’ negotiations.Keywords
Funding Information
- Charles University Research Centre (UNCE/HUM/028)
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