Compiler mitigations for time attacks on modern x86 processors
Authors:
Open Access
- 26 January 2012
- journal article
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Architecture and Code Optimization
- Vol. 8 (4) , 1-20
Abstract
This paper studies and evaluates the extent to which automated compiler techniques can defend against timing-based side channel attacks on modern x86 processors. We study how modern x86 processors can leak timing information through side channels that relate to data flow. We study the efficiency, effectiveness, portability, predictability and sensitivity of several mitigating code transformations that eliminate or minimize key-dependent execution time variations. Furthermore, we discuss the extent to which compiler backends are a suitable tool to provide automated support for the proposed mitigations.Keywords
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