Complexity of manipulation, bribery, and campaign management in Bucklin and fallback voting
- 2 October 2014
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
- Vol. 29 (6) , 1091-1124
Abstract
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This publication has 30 references indexed in Scilit:
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