Overview of the Mceliece Cryptosystem and its Security
Authors:
Open Access
- 1 September 2014
- journal article
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Tatra Mountains Mathematical Publications
- Vol. 60 (1) , 57-83
Abstract
McEliece cryptosystem (MECS) is one of the oldest public key cryptosystems, and the oldest PKC that is conjectured to be post-quantum secure. In this paper we survey the current state of the implementation issues and security of MECS, and its variants. In the first part we focus on general decoding problem, structural attacks, and the selection of parameters in general. We summarize the details of MECS based on irreducible binary Goppa codes, and review some of the implementation challenges for this system. Furthermore, we survey various proposals that use alternative codes for MECS, and point out some attacks on modified systems. Finally, we review notable existing implementations on low-resource platforms, and conclude with the topic of side channels in the implementations of MECSKeywords
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