Did amakudari undermine the effectiveness of regulator monitoring in Japan?
Authors:
- Akiyoshi HoriuchiAHAkiyoshi Horiuchi
- Katsutoshi ShimizuKSKatsutoshi Shimizu
- 1 March 2001
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Banking & Finance
- Vol. 25 (3) , 573-596
Abstract
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