Abstract
The dedicated docket was introduced by the Biden Administration to expedite the processing of asylum claims. It creates a separate queue for immigration proceedings where judges are supposed to issue a decision for each asylum case within a target timeframe. The administration announced the docket with the goals of speed, accuracy, and fairness. Though the program meets its first goal, legal advocacy groups report that this comes at the expense of the last. Referring to it as a "Denial of justice", they find that cases on the dedicated docket routinely fail to access legal representation, and have a much lower asylum grant rate. We aim to understand the operational implication of the dedicated docket. In our stylized queueing model, a policy maker (PM) routes asylees to either the regular or the dedicated docket, and sets a delay target for the dedicated one. Constrained by the target, the court allocates its limited capacity to minimize the average delay. Immigration lawyers schedule their time between dockets to maximize the rate of successful asylum cases. Compared to a single-docket benchmark, we show that the dedicated-docket system can Pareto-improve both the speed at which cases are adjudicated and the rate of accurately decided asylum cases. Our proof is constructive: for a given sufficiently large queue length we design PM decisions (routing choices and delay target) that yield the same queue length and a higher accuracy than a single docket benchmark. The PM assigns asylees to each docket so as to ensure that (i) there are more cases on the dedicated docket than the regular one, (ii) the dedicated docket is faster than the regular one, and (iii) the workload from the regular docket is just sufficient to overload the lawyers' capacity. Our characterization of the lawyers' best response implies, under these conditions, that lawyers spend all their effort on regular docket cases and none on cases from the dedicated docket. We highlight that the resulting improvement relies on a careful operational analysis. A misspecification of the two-docket system can lead to worse performance than the single docket's. Moreover, we prove that a Pareto-improvement necessarily disadvantages cases on one of the two dockets. We propose two definitions to formalize fairness between dockets: fairness in effort and fairness in outcome. Fairness in effort requires that it is incentive compatible for lawyers to allocate their effort (time) in a way that asylees on either docket receive equal effort from lawyers on average; fairness in outcome requires that it is incentive compatible for lawyers to allocate effort such that asylees on either docket have the same probability of an asylee's application getting completely prepared. Our result shows that any two-docket system, that satisfies either notion of fairness between dockets, must be Pareto-dominated, with respect to accuracy and queue-length, by a corresponding single-docket system. Our result thus reveals that unfairness between dockets is a fundamental requirement of an efficient two-docket system. A full version of this paper can be found at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4785713.