Empirical organizational-level examinations of agency and collaborative predictions of performance-contingent compensation
Authors:
- 1 May 2000
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Strategic Management Journal
- Vol. 21 (5) , 611-623
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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