OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION AND FIRM PERFORMANCE IN RUSSIA: THE CASE OF BLUE CHIPS OF THE STOCK MARKET
Authors:
- 1 December 2001
- journal article
- Published by Akademiai Kiado Zrt. in Acta Oeconomica
- Vol. 51 (4) , 469-488
Abstract
Based on panel data from 1995.1997, the paper focusses on the impact of ownership concentration on the performance of Russian non-financial privatised companies that constitute the group of .blue chips. of the country.s stock market. We consider three indicators of company performance . labour productivity, profitability, and Tobins.s q . and employ instrumental variables technique to correct regression results for endogeneity of ownership. We find that ownership concentration positively affects labour productivity, but has a negative impact on Tobins.s q. The relationship between ownership concentration and profitability follows a U-shaped pattern with the turning point at 56% concentration. These findings imply that ownership concentration results in higher technical efficiency of enterprises, but the benefits from productivity improvements do not accrue to all shareholders. This is consistent with the expropriation hypothesis that large owners use their power to extract private benefits of control.Keywords
This publication has 20 references indexed in Scilit:
- Corporate Governance and Employee Ownership in an Economic Crisis: Enterprise Strategies in the Former USSRJournal of Comparative Economics, 1999
- Ownership Concentration and Corporate Performance in the Czech RepublicJournal of Comparative Economics, 1999
- Ownership Concentration and Share Valuation: Evidence from GermanySSRN Electronic Journal, 1999
- Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the FirmThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1997
- A Survey of Corporate GovernanceThe Journal of Finance, 1997
- When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms, Codetermination, and Economic DemocracyThe Yale Law Journal, 1990
- Private benefits from control of public corporationsJournal of Financial Economics, 1989
- Managerial control of voting rightsJournal of Financial Economics, 1988
- The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and ConsequencesJournal of Political Economy, 1985
- Agency Problems and Residual ClaimsThe Journal of Law and Economics, 1983