Top pay transparency in Europe: codes, convergence and clichés
Authors:
- Sébastien PointSPSébastien Point
- Shaun TysonSTShaun Tyson
- 1 May 2006
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The International Journal of Human Resource Management
- Vol. 17 (5) , 812-830
Abstract
Following the waves of corporate scandals and the increasing attention to corporate governance, the transparency of reporting on director-level pay has increased across Europe. This article examines the extent of convergence in laws, codes and corporate reporting practices in regard to director-level pay in France, Germany, Switzerland and the UK. The paper analyses annual reports and the websites of 23 companies, using institutional theory to discuss the coercive, normative and mimetic pressures for convergence that are revealed, not just in the laws and codes in each country, but also in the standardized wording in the relevant sections of reports which have become clichés.Keywords
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