Concepts versus conceptions (again)
Author:
- 1 February 2010
- journal article
- open peer-commentary
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 33 (2-3) , 221-222
Abstract
Machery neglects the crucial role of concepts in psychological explanation, as well as the efforts of numerous “externalists” of the last 40 years to provide an account of that role. He rightly calls attention to the wide variation in people's epistemic relations to concepts – people'sconceptionsof things – but fails to appreciate how externalist and kindred proposals offer the needed stability in concepts themselves that underlies that variation.Keywords
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