Exiting the Coalition: When Do States Abandon Coalition Partners during War?
Author:
- 30 August 2016
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 60 (4) , 753-765
Abstract
When do countries abandon coalition partners during war? Prominent arguments about alliance dissolution focus on peacetime, yet the ability of alliances to influence international politics ultimately hinges on their cohesion or dissolution during war. In this article, I argue that battlefield circumstances heavily influence the likelihood of defection from coalitions. First, countries fighting independently from their partners make attractive candidates for wedge strategies and hence are more likely to defect. Second, coalitions are more likely to collapse when their members see victory in the overall war as less likely. These predictions contrast with common expectations from theories of the balance of power and of collective action. I test hypotheses about wartime developments statistically using new time-varying data on both front-level troop contributions and battle deaths. Consistent with theoretical predictions, countries are more likely to abandon coalition partners if fighting alone and when the coalition fares worse in recent fighting.Keywords
This publication has 56 references indexed in Scilit:
- Zombies and International Relations: A Simple Guide for Bringing the Undead into Your ClassroomInternational Studies Perspectives, 2012
- Response to Thomas Knecht's Review of Securing Approval: Domestic Politics and Multilateral Authorization for WarPerspectives on Politics, 2012
- The Decider's Dilemma: Leader Culpability, War Outcomes, and Domestic PunishmentAmerican Political Science Review, 2011
- Preventing Enemy Coalitions: How Wedge Strategies Shape Power PoliticsInternational Security, 2011
- The Costs of RenegingJournal of Conflict Resolution, 2008
- The Stability of a Unipolar WorldInternational Security, 1999
- Why alliances endure or collapseSurvival, 1997
- Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist TheoryInternational Security, 1994
- Chain gangs and passed bucks: predicting alliance patterns in multipolarityInternational Organization, 1990
- An Economic Theory of AlliancesReview of Economics and Statistics, 1966