Promises and conventions – An approach to pre-play agreements
Author:
- Topi MiettinenTMTopi Miettinen
- 1 July 2013
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 80, 68-84
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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This publication has 39 references indexed in Scilit:
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