Knowledge transfer and partial equity ownership
Open Access
- 13 November 2017
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 48 (4) , 1044-1067
Abstract
An alliance often involves one firm acquiring an equity stake in its alliance partner. We explore oligopoly models that capture the link between knowledge transfer and partial equity ownership (PEO), where alliance partners can choose the level of PEO. PEO can increase the alliance partners' profitability by inducing knowledge transfer, but the PEO itself reduces their joint profit because it induces other firms to take more aggressive actions. This trade‐off endogenously determines the level of PEO, which can benefit consumers and/or improve welfare. Given the growing antitrust interest in PEO, we explore the antitrust implications of our analysis.Keywords
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Funding Information
- Australian Research Council
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