Credence: A Belief-First Approach
- 27 April 2020
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Canadian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 50 (5) , 652-669
Abstract
This paper explains and defends a belief-first view of the relationship between belief and credence. On this view, credences are a species of beliefs, and the degree of credence is determined by the content of what is believed. We begin by developing what we take to be the most plausible belief-first view. Then, we offer several arguments for it. Finally, we show how it can resist objections that have been raised to belief-first views. We conclude that the belief-first view is more plausible than many have previously supposed.Keywords
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