Evolutionary dynamics of collective action when individual fitness derives from group decisions taken in the past
- 1 April 2012
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Theoretical Biology
- Vol. 298, 8-15
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia
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