The role of risk preferences in bargaining when acceptance of a proposal requires less than unanimous approval
Author:
- 1 June 1990
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
- Vol. 3 (2) , 135-154
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 14 references indexed in Scilit:
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