Efficient Money Burning in General Domains
Authors:
- Dimitris FotakisDimitris Fotakis
- Dimitris TsiprasDTDimitris Tsipras
- Christos TzamosCTChristos Tzamos
- 7 November 2016
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory of Computing Systems
- Vol. 59 (4) , 619-640
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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