Retail Mergers, Buyer Power and Product Variety
Authors:
- 1 January 2007
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 117 (516) , 45-67
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 19 references indexed in Scilit:
- Auctions for Split‐Award ContractsThe Journal of Industrial Economics, 2003
- Do Buyer-Size Discounts Depend on the Curvature of the Surplus Function? Experimental Tests of Bargaining ModelsSSRN Electronic Journal, 2003
- The Role of Firm Size in Bilateral Bargaining: A Study of the Cable Television IndustryReview of Economics and Statistics, 1999
- Discount Chains and Brand PolicyThe Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 1999
- Nonlinear Supply Contracts, Exclusive Dealing, and Equilibrium Market ForeclosureJournal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1997
- Nonlinear Supply Contracts, Exclusive Dealing, and Equilibrium Market ForeclosureJournal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1997
- Countervailing power revisitedInternational Journal of Industrial Organization, 1996
- A Dynamic Theory of Countervailing PowerThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1996
- Split Awards, Procurement, and InnovationThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1989
- Bilateral Monopolies and Incentives for MergerThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1988