Spatial dilemmas of diffusible public goods

Authors:

Abstract
The emergence of cooperation is a central question in evolutionary biology. Microorganisms often cooperate by producing a chemical resource (a public good) that benefits other cells. The sharing of public goods depends on their diffusion through space. Previous theory suggests that spatial structure can promote evolution of cooperation, but the diffusion of public goods introduces new phenomena that must be modeled explicitly. We develop an approach where colony geometry and public good diffusion are described by graphs. We find that the success of cooperation depends on a simple relation between the benefits and costs of the public good, the amount retained by a producer, and the average amount retained by each of the producer’s neighbors. These quantities are derived as analytic functions of the graph topology and diffusion rate. In general, cooperation is favored for small diffusion rates, low colony dimensionality, and small rates of decay of the public good.
Funding Information
  • National Institutes of Health (NIH R00 GM085279-02)
  • National Science Foundation
  • Alfred P Sloan Foundation
  • Pew Scholars Program
  • Allen Investigator Program
  • John Templeton Foundation–Foundational Questions in Evolutionary Biology (RFP-12-02)
  • National Institutes of Health (NIH DP2)
  • National Institutes of Health (NIH R00 GM085279-02)
  • National Science Foundation
  • Alfred P Sloan Foundation
  • Pew Charitable Trusts
  • Allen Family Philanthropies
  • John Templeton Foundation (RFP-12-02)
  • National Institutes of Health (NIH DP2)

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