Employment Protection and Product Market Competition
Author:
- 31 July 2006
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- Vol. 108 (2) , 339-352
Abstract
A firm facing employment protection will defend its market position more fiercely than a rival firm operating without such restrictions. However, ex ante such firms may be more reluctant to expand. For the benchmark case of contest competition, the defensive effect dominates. A firm facing employment protection has a stronger average market position.Keywords
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