Do institutional investors monitor management? Evidence from the relationship between institutional ownership and capital structure
Authors:
- Chune Young ChungCCChune Young Chung
- Kainan WangKWKainan Wang
- 1 November 2014
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in The North American Journal of Economics and Finance
- Vol. 30, 203-233
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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