Legal Fee Restrictions, Moral Hazard, and Attorney Rents
Authors:
- Rudy SantoreRSRudy Santore
- Alan D. ViardAVAlan D. Viard
- 1 October 2001
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The Journal of Law and Economics
- Vol. 44 (2) , 549-572
Abstract
No abstract availableAll Related Versions
This publication has 10 references indexed in Scilit:
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