Education and the Employment Contract
Author:
- 1 January 1993
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Education Economics
- Vol. 1 (1) , 21-33
Abstract
Efficiency wage models explain unemployment as a manifestation of the unavoidable incompleteness of the employment contract. In hiring workers, firms use education as a screen in order to determine—amongst other things—the quantity and quality of the effort that a worker might exert in performing his or her duties. This generates a hierarchy of workers. Lay-offs then become a more efficient tool than across-the-board wage cuts for riding a slump, since the adverse morale and productivity effects of laying off of a minority of lower status workers are less severe than the alternative.Keywords
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