Linguistic signaling, emojis, and skin tone in trust games
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Open Access
- 1 June 2020
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 15 (6) , e0233277
Abstract
This paper reports the results of an experiment involving text-messaging and emojis in laboratory trust games executed on mobile devices. Decomposing chat logs, I find that trust increases dramatically with the introduction of emojis to one-shot games, while reciprocation increases only modestly. Skin tones embedded in emojis impact sharing and resulting gains—to the benefit of some and detriment to others. Both light and dark skin players trust less on receipt of a dark skin tone emoji—suggestive of statistical discrimination. In this way, computer-mediated communication leads to reduced gains for dark-skinned persons. These results highlight the complex social judgment that motivates trust in an anonymous counterpart.Keywords
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