Long-Term Care Insurance and Intra-family Moral Hazard: Fixed vs Proportional Insurance Benefits
- 16 February 2017
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review
- Vol. 42 (2) , 87-116
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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