The Effect of Sunk Costs on the Outcome of Alternating-Offers Bargaining Between Inequity-Averse Agents
- 1 April 2006
- journal article
- bargaining
- Published by Springer Nature in Schmalenbach Business Review
- Vol. 58 (2) , 184-203
Abstract
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This publication has 27 references indexed in Scilit:
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