Practical Quantum Key Distribution Secure Against Side-Channels
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Abstract
There is a big gap between theory and practice in quantum key distribution (QKD) because real devices do not satisfy the assumptions required by the security proofs. Here, we close this gap by introducing a simple and practical measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD type of protocol, based on the transmission of coherent light, for which we prove its security against any possible device imperfection and/or side-channel at the transmitters' side. Besides using a much simpler experimental set-up and source characterization with only one single parameter, we show that the performance of the protocol is comparable to other MDI-QKD type of protocols which disregard the effect of several side-channels.Keywords
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