THE EPISTEMIC ACCOUNT OF PRIVACY
- 24 May 2013
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Episteme
- Vol. 10 (2) , 167-177
Abstract
Privacy is valued by many. But what it means to have privacy remains less than clear. In this paper, I argue that the notion of privacy should be understood in epistemic terms. What it means to have (some degree of) privacy is that other persons do not stand in significant epistemic relations to those truths one wishes to keep private.Keywords
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