Better informed than early? A comparison of two types of leaders in an oligopoly market with demand uncertainty
Authors:
- Ruochen LiRLRuochen Li
- Yilin LvYLYilin Lv
- Jie ZhengJZJie Zheng
- 29 May 2026
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Information Economics and Policy
- Vol. 73
Abstract
No abstract availableFunding Information
- Natural Science Foundation of Shandong Province (ZR2024MG004)
- Natural Science Foundation of Shandong Province (ZR2023QG016)
- Shandong University
- Sun Yat-sen University
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (72503117)
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (72073080)
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