The Extent of the Market and the Supply of Regulation
Authors:
- C. B. MulliganCMC. B. Mulligan
- A. ShleiferASA. Shleifer
Top Cited Papers
- 1 November 2005
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Vol. 120 (4) , 1445-1473
Abstract
We present a model in which setting up and running a regulatory institution takes a fixed cost. As a consequence, the supply of regulation is limited by the extent of the market. We test three implications of this model. First, jurisdictions with larger populations affected by a given regulation are more likely to have it. Second, jurisdictions with lower incremental fixed costs of introducing and ad- ministering new regulations should regulate more. This implies that regulation spreads from higher to lower population jurisdictions, and that jurisdictions that build up transferable regulatory capabilities should regulate more intensely. Consistent with the model, we find that higher population U. S. states have more pages of legislation and adopt particular laws earlier in their history than do smaller states. We also find that the regulation of entry, the regulation of labor, and the military draft are more extensive in countries with larger populations, as well as in civil law countries, where we argue that the incremental fixed costs are lower. I. INTRODUCTION In a classic paper Demsetz (1967) argues that the creation of institutions requires a fixed cost, and is therefore limited by the extent of the market. Introducing an institution only becomes efficient when the scale of an activity it supports becomes signifi- cant enough to cover the fixed costs of creating and running it. Using the example of Indians in the Quebec region circa 1700, Demsetz maintains that the aggregate value of fur trading ex- plains the emergence of enforced land ownership rights. In this paper we show that Demsetz's logic concerning the role of fixed costs in creating and enforcing additional rules and regulations is quite general theoretically but also valid empirically. We present a model in which the supply of regulation is limited by the extent of the market, and test its predictions for whether and how particular activities are regulated across communities. The two main traditions of regulatory economics do not focusKeywords
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