Abstract
Armed conflicts create simultaneous safety, operational, economic, legal, and environmental risks for international civil aviation because military activity can change the usability of airspace faster than conventional route-planning and information cycles can respond. This study examines how conflict-related airspace restrictions affect civil aviation and which governance arrangements can reduce the resulting risks. A structured narrative review and comparative policy analysis were conducted using peer-reviewed studies and official materials issued between 2014 and 29 October 2026 by international organizations, aviation authorities, accident investigators, and Ukrainian institutions. The evidence was coded by threat type, regulatory response, network effect, and risk-control mechanism. The findings show that an open-versus-closed classification is insufficient: operational decisions depend on weapon capability, the probability of misidentification, the reliability of aeronautical information, the availability of alternative routes, and the capacity of neighbouring flight information regions. The international framework distributes responsibility among the state managing the airspace, states of aircraft operators, air navigation service providers, and operators; state sovereignty therefore does not remove the operator's duty to conduct an independent assessment. The Ukrainian case demonstrates the necessity of complete closure when threats extend across all flight levels, while the continued operation of other conflict-affected airspaces illustrates the use of partial restrictions and operator-specific prohibitions. Published trajectory evidence indicates that the restrictions affecting Ukraine and the Russian Federation changed approximately 1,100 flights per day and increased average fuel consumption on affected services by about 13 percent; estimated additional emissions reached 8.2 million tonnes of carbon dioxide in 2023, about 1 percent of global civil aviation emissions. The review also finds that information sharing has improved since the destruction of flight MH17, but public advisories remain heterogeneous and time-sensitive. Effective risk governance requires continuous threat monitoring, harmonized communication, documented operator decisions, and coordinated contingency planning rather than reliance on a single notice or a formal airspace status.