Relationship and Transaction Lending in a Crisis
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Open Access
- 7 June 2016
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Financial Studies
- Vol. 29 (10) , 2643-2676
Abstract
We study how relationship lending and transaction lending vary over the business cycle. We develop a model in which relationship banks gather information on their borrowers, allowing them to provide loans to profitable firms during a crisis. Because of the services they provide, operating costs of relationship banks are higher than those of transaction banks. Relationship banks charge a higher intermediation spread in normal times, but offer continuation lending at more favourable terms than transaction banks to profitable firms in a crisis. Using credit register information for Italian banks before and after the Lehman Brothers’ default, we test the theoretical predictions of the model.Keywords
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