Exploring the dilemma of overcapacity governance in China's coal industry: A tripartite evolutionary game model
Authors:
- Yadong WangYWYadong Wang
- Delu WangDWDelu Wang
- Xunpeng ShiXunpeng Shi
- 1 June 2021
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Resources Policy
- Vol. 71
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (71573252, 71828401, 72074210, 18JD014, 2018WHCC01)
- Natural Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province (71573252, 71828401, 72074210, 18JD014, 2018WHCC01)
- China University of Mining and Technology (71573252, 71828401, 72074210, 18JD014, 2018WHCC01)
- Social Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province (71573252, 71828401, 72074210, 18JD014, 2018WHCC01)
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