The limits of self-governance when cooperators get punished: Experimental evidence from urban and rural Russia
Authors:
- Simon GächterSGSimon Gächter
- Benedikt HerrmannBHBenedikt Herrmann
- 1 February 2011
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 55 (2) , 193-210
Abstract
No abstract availableAll Related Versions
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