The currently dominant digital platforms are associated with many negative effects on democratic societies, such as disinformation, hate speech, and propaganda. In the case of X, the platform has become a personal megaphone for its owner Elon Musk. The “Great Sysop” has gained considerable power over public opinion formation and is promoting “platform illiberalism” (Magalhães et al.). However, Twitter has also added valuable features that have enhanced public communication, particulary in journalism, which is the focus of the present article. Journalists used Twitter for purposes such as live reporting, news aggregation, including citizens as sources, organising debates (Artwick), and fact checking (Coddington et al.). Hermida coined the term “ambient journalism” to describe journalism’s role on Twitter as a novel “awareness system”. In 2014, a newsroom survey in Germany compared the use of different platforms in journalism (Neuberger et al.). Twitter was most often used for brief breaking news and real-time reporting. Editorial staff also utilised Twitter and Facebook relatively often for investigation and monitoring. Twitter was used especially to contact elite sources, such as experts and prominent people, and for monitoring their public appearances. Twitter and Facebook were the preferred platforms for user participation in journalism. Twitter served as a testing ground for new forms of journalism. But this is all history. These achievements have been lost since Elon Musk took over the platform. This raises the questions: how should a common good-oriented platform be designed and governed? What lessons can be learned from the journalistic adaptation of Twitter? I will address these questions by focussing on the transnational European public sphere. The philosopher Jürgen Habermas (Für Europa), who passed away in March 2026, continued to advocate for European autonomy, integration, and democratisation, particularly in the context of today's polycrisis. He believed that establishing a common European public sphere by transnationalising the many national public spheres is essential (Habermas, Demokratie 188–91). But the European public sphere still has significant shortcomings (e.g., Brüggemann and Kleinen-von Königslöw; Brüggemann et al.). There is a lack of European media, audiences interested in European issues, and European perspectives in national media. Europeanisation is particularly evident in the vertical dimension (“looking towards Brussels”), but less so in the horizontal dimension. Looking beyond national borders at other national discourses is therefore crucial here. Another weakness is the low citizen participation in the European public sphere. The question of a European public sphere has regained importance in recent years. In light of the current geopolitical situation, the European Union (EU) is striving for greater digital sovereignty. This concept emphasises state authority over the Internet, replacing the earlier concept of “multistakeholderism”, which viewed the Internet as a distinct, decentralised, and transnational space beyond the reach of politics (Pohle and Santianello). The call for digital sovereignty encompasses not only the technical and economic dimension, but also the political and cultural dimension. Digital sovereignty “must not be conflated with isolation or protectionism, in the European context, it can be described as the capacity of being independent while remaining open to collaboration and committed to shared values such as transparency, democracy, and the rule of law” (Bria et al. 10). European values are often cited as the goal of digital sovereignty (e.g., Di Marco et al.; Kagermann and Wilhelm; Roberts et al.), but are not precisely defined. The EU is often criticised for over-regulating platforms and AI, hindering innovation and competitiveness. However, there are serious doubts as to whether this criticism is valid (Bradford, False Choice). Nevertheless, the EU must not only regulate, but also provide better platforms. This requires a change in mindset: regulation only defines the minimum normative requirements that must be met in every case. This negative approach must then be complemented by a positive one that describes how platforms can promote the common good. The EU could offer a more appealing alternative to the libertarian approach of the US and the authoritarian approach of China (Bradford, Digital Empires). But how can the common good be defined? In the media sector, it is usually referred to as “public value”. This management concept was introduced by Mark H. Moore in his seminal book Creating Public Value. It was intended as a practical framework for public sector management, offering an alternative to the market-oriented, neo-liberal “new public management” and its premise that the public good is simply the sum of individual consumer interests. In contrast to this market-oriented view, the public value concept focusses on contributions to society’s common good beyond individual self-interest (Alford and Hughes 132; Moore, “Reflections” 366–9). The BBC adopted it in its programmatic statement Building Public Value. In this statement, public value was defined through three “public principles” (universality, fairness and equity, accountability) and five “public purposes” (democratic value, cultural and creative value, educational value, social and community value, global value) (7–8). A recent paper, Creating and Measuring Dynamic Public Value at the BBC, distinguishes between individual value, social value, and industrial value (Mazzucato et al. 23–8). The BBC’s public value test for public broadcasting outlets has been adopted by many EU countries (Collins; Donders). Some scholars have criticised a lack of clarity about what public value means substantially (e.g., Benington 42–6; Collins 175). Others have argued that public value cannot be defined “in some absolute sense” (Alford and Hughes 133) because public value must be, at least partially, open to the outcomes of democratic political processes (Alford and O’Flynn 175–8; Benington 233–4). The concept of hybrid common good offers a solution for these contradictory expectations (Blum; Neuberger, Auftrag). According to this approach, the common good comprises a substantive component consisting of liberal-democratic values to be realised in the value creation process, alongside public discourse as procedural component, in which those values are interpreted and concretised. These values are the “guardrails”, setting the boundaries for possible outcomes of the democratic public discourse, and also the standards for the discourse itself. How can the European values be defined more precisely? One obvious option is to derive them from normative theories of democracy. Several proposals have been made as to how normative theories of democracy can be applied to the public sphere and journalism (e.g., Christians et al. 95–105, 125–7; Ferree et al.; Gerhards; Martinsen; McQuail; Strömbäck). While these typologies differ, the theories agree that the media should at least create a common public sphere and a shared body of knowledge on current topics of public interest. Both are necessary prerequisites for the formation of individual and collective opinion. Valid and shared knowledge requires news production to be based on journalistic standards and to allow freedom of information and equal access to knowledge. However, beyond this, the theories make different demands regarding the process of opinion formation. Deliberative theory sets higher normative expectations for discourse progression than liberal and participatory theory (Martinsen). It demands a rational, respectful, and domination-free discourse in which the persuasiveness of the better argument—in the best case—leads to consensus. In summary, nine values of the public sphere can be derived from theories of democracy, whose normative expectations partially overlap: news and discourse quality, freedom, equality, diversity, power symmetry, criticism and control, security, and integration (Neuberger, Öffentlichkeit). A more democratic digital public sphere cannot be achieved simply by regulating existing platform and AI companies. It is equally important to create media platforms and AI applications that are oriented towards the common good as an alternative to the commercial offerings that currently dominate the market. Although Habermas acknowledged the potential of the digital public sphere to contribute to the emancipation of citizens, he viewed the Internet as an “ambivalent explosive force” (Habermas, New Structural 35). He missed a “substitute for the professional selection and discursive examination of contents based on accepted cognitive standards” (38–39) on these platforms. Since 2017, there has been an ongoing discussion about the idea of a European media platform oriented towards the common good that would fulfil European values, create a European public sphere, and strengthen Europe’s digital sovereignty. Ulrich Wilhelm, the director of the Bavarian Broadcasting Corporation (Bayerischer Rundfunk), was the first and strongest advocate of this idea. He expressed concern that “Europe is in danger of losing digital sovereignty over its defining values” (Wilhelm 15; translated by the author). Van Dijck, Poell, and de Waal (146) outlined a “value-centric design of the platform society”, which should realise “public values” such as safety, privacy, transparency, accuracy, democratic control, quality, accessibility, comprehensiveness, equality, inclusiveness, fair treatment, responsibility, and accountability (139–41). Hillje (133–60) proposed four elements for a “Platform Europe”: a European newsroom and a European news service, opportunities for citizens to participate, a cultural connection representing Europe's diversity and common “European Way of Life”, and apps for citizens to take action and interact. Another plan proposed the creation of a European infrastructure for public service media and other media, as well as for science, culture, and citizens (Kagermann and Wilhelm). What has been achieved until now? Not much. Several proposals have been made to create a European media platform. The Council for European Public Space, an NGO, has developed a draft for a decentralised platform for trustworthy news called “Delphi” (Pfeffer). The Public Spaces Incubator (PSI) brings together public service media from different countries to work together to develop platforms for better public dialogue. The PSI toolkit will be made publicly available as open-source software by 2027. The European Cultural Foundation develops and supports cultural initiatives that foster “belonging, solidarity, and democratic values—building connections across Europe and empowering communities to shape a shared future.” It presented the draft for European Digital Public Spaces back in 2020. France and Germany intend to expand their joint cultural television channel arte into a European media platform (Der Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Kultur und Medien). In 2025, the Second German Television (ZDF) presented its plan for a public-interest-oriented Digital Public Open Space (Dogruel et al.). There are many plans, but it remains to be seen whether they can be successfully realised in future. The drafts for a European media platform largely leave open the question of which values they intend to achieve and how. Only smaller projects promoting European news exchange and discourse have been established so far. One such project is the press review euro|topics – European Press Roundup, which monitors European discourses and translates the main contributions from leading newspapers into five languages. This project was founded by the German Federal Agency for Civic Education (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, bpb) as early as 2005. A European Perspective (AEP) is a transnational European newsroom, launched by public service media in 2021. Its 23 member organisations from 17 countries exchange news and translate news using the AI-assisted EuroVox tool. In 2024, AEP launched YEP News (Your European Perspective), a multilingual news aggregator that reports on major European and global issues. A compelling concept for such a platform is still lacking. While Twitter certainly opened up new possibilities for journalism, it was not primarily created to improve democracy. Therefore, simply copying it would not suffice. It would be better to first define the modules required for a European media platform that is oriented towards the common good. In line with the mission of public service media, such a platform could encompass journalism, education, advice, culture, and entertainment. This article, however, focusses on journalism, which contributes to the common good in two ways: by producing and disseminating news and comments, and by moderating public discourse. Unlike traditional mass media, digital platforms are not limited to the linear dissemination of news and comments. They also enable interactive communication, broad participation in the public discourse, and the archiving of verified news and justified opinions. Taking these digital capabilities into account, a matrix of journalistic platform modules can be developed that integrates dissemination, discourse, and archiving (table 1). These modules complement each other and are closely interconnected: news and comments distributed by the media provide ongoing opportunities for public discourse, during which their justification is questioned and clarified through argumentation. Validated news and opinions, along with their justifications, are stored in the archive and can be reintroduced into the process, serving as context for current events or providing argumentative support. However, they can also be corrected and supplemented themselves. Knowledge Assessment Journalistic intermediation Short-term: Production and dissemination News Comment Professional production and linear dissemination Medium-term: Public discourse Epistemic validation Opinion formation process Professional moderation (ensuring broad participation and deliberative quality of discourses) Long-term: Archiving Validated knowledge as context Documentation of opinion and its justification (pros and cons) Professional archiving and referencing Table 1: Modules of a journalistic platform The envisioned journalistic platform modules should connect three spatial levels: the local, national, and European. Yochai Benkler’s normative concept of an integrated networked public sphere, which he outlined back in 2006, is helpful here. The goal of this concept is to strike the right balance between openness and closedness in public discourse. Both are necessary, but also risky: openness brings participation and diversity, but also information overload, loss of news quality (disinformation), and rude discourse (hate speech). On the side of closedness, gatekeeping ensures news and discourse quality, but focussing attention on a small number of relevant topics (agenda-setting) can lead to a concentration of power and lack of diversity. According to Benkler, the tension between openness and closedness should be resolved by distributing specific tasks across the different levels of the public sphere and by the gradual processing of news and comments in different phases. This begins with a high degree of diversity in topics and related news and comments across numerous mini-publics at the local level, with strong citizen participation. This continues at the national and European level, mediated by journalistic selection and moderation. At the European level, exchanges between the national publics should be encouraged. At higher levels and in later phases, the publics merge and diversity in rational discourse is reduced when selection decisions are made about the relevance of topics, the accuracy of news, and the (better) justification of opinions. This narrowing of the focus in a bottom-up process should not be centralised or finalised. Rather than the “hard” selection decisions (gatekeeping) of traditional mass media, a recommendation-based approach and “soft” (revisable) selection process (gatewatching: see Bruns) should be adopted. This multi-level architecture helps to ensure that the concrete local experiences of citizens remain connected to the political decisions made at higher levels in distant capitals. Topics can be covered and discussed on platforms in the long term, with knowledge and opinions from the archive providing context. Of course, theories of democracy should not be the only normative benchmark for the European media platform. Additional modules are required to strengthen identity, community building, social cohesion, and connections between different lifeworld experiences (Bengesser). What steps are necessary for the design of such a European media platform? Digital transformation is an ongoing process of change, meaning that the conditions for realising democratic values are also perpetually changing (Coeckelbergh, Digital Humanism 3). This requires continuous learning and weighing up of new chances and risks. Appropriate learning environments include innovation labs (García-Avilés) and pioneer communities (Hepp and Loosen). This process of experimentation could be observed in the case of Twitter and is also currently evident in the field of generative artificial intelligence (Jungherr). Negative effects have become apparent, such as incorrect outputs, bias, unfairness, opacity, copyright violations, and environmental costs. Conversely, visions were developed on how to strengthen democracy with AI and how to democratise AI (Coeckelbergh, Undermines 70-119). There are already many AI applications that are conducive to democracy: LLM-powered chatbots can enhance news diversity (Heitz et al.), improve the quality of political discourse (Argyle et al.), and verify political information (Kuznetsova et al.). Pioneer communities such as the German AI for Media Network support systematic learning. An experimental approach is needed to exploit the opportunities and limits of digital technologies for democracy, following the concepts of “experimental democracy” by John Dewey and “piecemeal technology” by Karl R. Popper. Both authors recommended taking small, reversible steps to test new paths in democracy. In addition to the editorial development of a European media platform outlined here, the necessary institutional and legal frameworks must be created. If a new organisation is not established, existing public service media organisations should cooperate within the framework of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), for example. Furthermore, a political consensus must be reached among EU member states. This will certainly be the greatest challenge. The rise of right-wing populist parties and the erosion of democracy in several EU countries is both the main reason for taking measures to...