Toward a theory of agency and altruism in family firms
Authors:
- William S SchulzeWSWilliam S Schulze
- Michael H LubatkinMLMichael H Lubatkin
- Richard N DinoRDRichard N Dino
Top Cited Papers
- 1 July 2003
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Business Venturing
- Vol. 18 (4) , 473-490
Abstract
No abstract availableAll Related Versions
This publication has 26 references indexed in Scilit:
- SELF‐INTEREST, ALTRUISM, INCENTIVES, AND AGENCY THEORYJournal of Applied Corporate Finance, 1994
- Environment‐strategy relationship and its performance implications: An empirical study of the chinese electronics industryStrategic Management Journal, 1994
- New venture strategies: An empirical identification of eight ‘archetypes’ of competitive strategies for entryStrategic Management Journal, 1990
- A Fresh Look at the Rotten Kid Theorem--and Other Household MysteriesJournal of Political Economy, 1989
- Altruism and Time Consistency: The Economics of Fait AccompliJournal of Political Economy, 1988
- The Role of the Board in the Threshold FirmFamily Business Review, 1988
- Agency Problems and Residual ClaimsThe Journal of Law and Economics, 1983
- Managing human resources in family firms: The problem of institutional overlapOrganizational Dynamics, 1983
- Rent Seeking, Noncompensated Transfers, and Laws of SuccessionThe Journal of Law and Economics, 1983
- Power, Performance, and Succession in the Large CorporationAdministrative Science Quarterly, 1982