Feudal political economy
Top Cited Papers
Open Access
- 10 July 2024
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 80 (2) , 619-658
Abstract
How is order achieved in a realm in which every elite commands both economic and military resources, and no stable institutions of power exist? We depict coalition formation in the feudal world as a series of non-binding agreements between elites who can move in and out of the coalition, through peaceful and violent means. We derive conditions under which the realm unites under one rule — a grand coalition, or remains fragmented. We motivate our analysis with key historical episodes in medieval Europe, from the Frankish Kingdom in the 5th to 10th centuries and England in the 11th to 15th centuries.Keywords
Funding Information
- John Templeton Foundation (6259)
- Mercatus Center, George Mason University
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