Preamble Injection and Spoofing Attacks in Wi-Fi Networks
Authors:
- 1 December 2021
- conference paper
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 1-6
Abstract
In Wi-Fi networks, every frame begins with a preamble that is used to support frame detection, synchro-nization, and channel estimation. The preamble also establishes compatibility and interoperability among devices that operate different Wi-Fi versions (e.g., IEEE 802.11a/g/n/ac/ax). Despite the crucial functions of the preamble, no guarantees can be made on its authenticity or confidentiality. Only weak integrity protection is currently possible. In this paper, we introduce novel Preamble Injection and Spoofing (PrInS) attacks that exploit the vulnerabilities of the preamble. Specifically, an adversary can inject forged preambles without any payload for the purpose of disrupting legitimate receptions or forcing legitimate users to de-fer their transmissions. The proposed PrInS attacks are effective irrespective of the Wi-Fi versions used by the adversary and its targets, as the attacks take advantage of the physical (PHY) layer receive state machine and/or capture effect. The efficacy of our attacks are validated experimentally using software-defined radios (SDRs). Our results show that the adversary can almost silence the channel, bringing the throughput of a legitimate user to 2% of its normal throughput. Even at 30 dB less power, the adversary still causes an 87% reduction in the legitimate users' throughput. To mitigate the PrInS attacks, we propose a backward-compatible scheme for preamble authentication.Keywords
Funding Information
- NSF (CNS-1563655,CNS-1731164,IIP-1822071)
This publication has 11 references indexed in Scilit:
- Protecting wi-fi beacons from outsider forgeries2020
- Expanding the Role of Preambles to Support User-defined Functionality in MIMO-based WLANs2020
- Dragonblood: Analyzing the Dragonfly Handshake of WPA3 and EAP-pwd2020
- Orthogonality-Sabotaging Attacks against OFDMA-based Wireless Networks2019
- Testbed to Study the Capture Effect: Can We Rely on this Effect in Modern Wi-Fi Networks2018
- Secrecy beyond encryption: obfuscating transmission signatures in wireless communicationsIEEE Communications Magazine, 2015
- Swift Jamming Attack on Frequency Offset Estimation: The Achilles’ Heel of OFDM SystemsIEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, 2015
- The scrambler attack: A robust physical layer attack on location privacy in vehicular networks2015
- Jamming attacks against OFDM timing synchronization and signal acquisition2012
- An experimental study on the capture effect in 802.11a networks2007