On multi-level apportionment
Open Access
- 11 November 2025
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- p. 1-17
Abstract
Apportionment refers to the well-studied problem of allocating legislative seats among parties or groups with different entitlements. We present a multi-level generalization of apportionment where the groups form a hierarchical structure, which gives rise to stronger versions of the upper and lower quota notions. We show that running Adams’ method level-by-level satisfies upper quota, while running Jefferson’s method or the quota method level-by-level guarantees lower quota. Moreover, we prove that both quota notions can always be fulfilled simultaneously.Keywords
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Funding Information
- National Science Foundation (DMS-1928930)
- Alfred P. Sloan Foundation (G-2021-16778)
- Ministry of Education - Singapore (MOE-T2EP20221-0001)
- National University of Singapore
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