Multiple Large Shareholders and Corporate Risk-taking: Evidence from French Family Firms
- 6 March 2016
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in European Financial Management
- Vol. 22 (4) , 697-745
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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