Darwin's doubt or Plantinga's conviction? Some failures in Plantinga's attempt to debunk naturalistic evolution
- 12 July 2023
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Religious Studies
- Vol. 61 (1) , 194-209
Abstract
Darwin's Doubt (DD) – a thesis according to which the probability of the human cognitive mechanism's reliability given non-guided evolution is low – is central to Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism and his suggestion that the adoption of guided evolution thesis is preferable from a theory choice point of view. In this article I'll argue that there are three fundamental failures in Plantinga's argument. First, I argue that Plantinga's argument for DD is question-begging. Second, I point out that this very same argument is not in accordance with the way the evolutionary scientists usually reason. And finally I argue that the replacement of non-guided by guided evolution violates some reasonable belief-revision procedures in the history of science.Keywords
Funding Information
- John Templeton Foundation (61556)
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