The Impact of a Strong Bank-Firm Relationship on the Borrowing Firm
Authors:
- Nishant DassNDNishant Dass
- Massimo MassaMMMassimo Massa
Open Access
- 24 September 2009
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Financial Studies
- Vol. 24 (4) , 1204-1260
Abstract
Commercial banks acquire inside information about the firms they lend to. We study the impact of this informationally privileged position on the borrowing firm using a broad panel of U.S. firms over the 1993–2004 period. We measure the strength of the bank-firm relationship by bank-firm proximity, size of the loan, and the lender's insider potential. We show that a stronger relationship, by inducing better monitoring, improves the borrower's corporate governance. Simultaneously, it makes the bank a potentially more informed agent in the equity market. This information asymmetry increases adverse selection for the other market participants and lowers the firm's stock liquidity. This trade-off between improved corporate governance and greater information asymmetry affects the firm's value. Our results have normative implications for the role of banks in the development of financial markets.Keywords
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- Alternative factor specifications, security characteristics, and the cross-section of expected stock returns1We are especially grateful to Eugene Fama (a referee), an anonymous referee and Bill Schwert (the editor) for insightful and constructive suggestions. We also thank Wayne Ferson, Ken French, Will Goetzmann, Craig Holden, Ravi Jagannathan, Bob Jennings, Bruce Lehmann, Josef Lakonishok, Richard Roll, participants at the 1997 Meetings of the Western Finance Association, the 1997 UCLA/USC/UC Irvine conference, the November 1997 Asset Pricing Meeting of the National Bureau of Economic Research, the Atlanta Forum, and seminars at Columbia, Indiana, Florida, New York, Tulane, and Yale Universities; Eugene Fama and Ken French for providing part of the data used in this study; and Christoph Schenzler for excellent programming assistance. The second author acknowledges support from the Dean's Fund for Research and the Financial Markets Research Center at Vanderbilt University. We are responsible for remaining errors. This paper was formerly titled `A Re-Examination of Security Return Anomalies'.1Journal of Financial Economics, 1998
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