Abstract
In addition to intermediating transactions of goods or services, two-sided platforms also play the role of data intermediaries in the era of the digital economy. This new role brings additional profit to the platforms, and in reality platforms are incentivized to collect and sell consumer data. The main distinction between the sale of data and the sale of services is that data are by-products of consumer behavior and are replicable, implying a difference in the platform's profit model. In a duopoly bilateral market, data collection and sales behaviors of platforms have yet to be characterized. In this paper, we build a two-period model to study data collection and sales of competitive platforms considering multihoming users and service providers. Our main findings are as follows. First, due to differences in costs, platforms may adopt differentiated or consistent data collection strategies in the following three ways: one platform fully collects while the other partially collects; both platforms fully collect; both platforms partially collect. In particular, when both platforms partially collect data, the cost-disadvantaged platform may invest more than its cost-advantaged counterpart. Second, when both platforms partially collect data, they should set different prices for the data, closely linked to their respective costs. In such scenarios, as data usage revenue increases, it may be more beneficial for both platforms to lower their data pricing. When both platforms fully collect, their data pricing is identical, irrelevant to investment costs. Third, when one platform fully collects data while the other opts for partial collection, the data pricing of the platform with full collection is mainly influenced by its competitor's cost and strategies, irrespective of its own investment cost. For the platform with partial collection, its data pricing is primarily affected by its own costs.

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