Rebel Groups as Predatory Organizations
Authors:
- 27 May 2009
- journal article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 53 (4) , 624-645
Abstract
In this article we propose a new typology for insurgent groups to explain why in such remarkably similar conflicts—Sri Lanka and Aceh—the impact of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami was so different. We argue that two principal factors shape all rebel groups by defining their incentive structures: the efficiency of the return on investment of the primary source(s) of support and the group's territorial objectives. The former factor is especially strong in explaining the different choices made by the LTTE and GAM. In Sri Lanka, the availability of lucrative resources outside the country has made the LTTE leadership inimical to compromise, threatened by relief aid, and less reliant on the local population. Lacking access to such high-return funding sources, GAM on the other hand was more closely linked to the needs of the local population and found greater value in both outside aid and a comprehensive settlement.Keywords
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