Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining: An Introduction for Economists Studying the Transnational Commons
Author:
- Roger B. MyersonRMRoger B. Myerson
- 4 December 1997
- book chapter
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 17-34
Abstract
The chapter discusses the different game-theoretic models of bargaining and serves as an introduction for economists studying the transnational commons. The chapter also explains the importance of bargaining and defines the transnational commons as the resources of the world, from the ozone layer to the deep ocean floor, that do not belong to any individual, organization, or nation. The chapter surveys some of the most important game-theoretic models of bargaining to see what they may tell us about the problems of the transnational commons. It also talks about Nash's demand game as well as the multiple equilibria in dynamic bargaining, and discusses the problems of arbitration, mediation, and multilateral bargaining in great detail.Keywords
This publication has 7 references indexed in Scilit:
- Alternating bid bargaining with a smallest money unitGames and Economic Behavior, 1990
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining ModelEconometrica, 1982
- On Compulsory-Arbitration SchemesJournal of Political Economy, 1979
- The Problem of Social CostThe Journal of Law and Economics, 1960
- Two-Person Cooperative GamesEconometrica, 1953
- Non-Cooperative GamesAnnals of Mathematics, 1951
- The Bargaining ProblemEconometrica, 1950