Channel coordination over time: incentive equilibria and credibility
Authors:
- Steffen JørgensenSJSteffen Jørgensen
- Georges ZaccourGZGeorges Zaccour
- 1 March 2003
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
- Vol. 27 (5) , 801-822
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 13 references indexed in Scilit:
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