Term-limit evasions and the non-compliance cycle
- 21 June 2021
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Constitutional Political Economy
- Vol. 32 (3) , 326-345
Abstract
Executive term limits are evidently under stress in many jurisdictions. One mode in which they are evaded is through the formal revision or abrogation of a constitution. Such a process accelerates a pernicious cycle in which constitutional non-compliance begets constitutional instability, which in turn begets subsequent non-compliance. Such a non-compliance cycle is a core problem in law, and one that deserves more careful examination in various domains. This essay unearths original historical evidence of term-limit provisions and executive tenure in an effort to illuminate and evaluate the phenomenon. A background concern is that of international (and domestic) approaches to term-limit evasion. One intellectual response is that of militant democracy. The logic of that approach would imply the entrenchment and protection of term limits, which would presumably disrupt the cycle of non-compliance.Keywords
Funding Information
- National Science Foundation (0648288)
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