Indirect Dynamic Negotiation in the Nash Demand Game
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Open Access
- 28 September 2022
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Access
- Vol. 10, 105008-105021
Abstract
The paper addresses a problem of sequential bilateral bargaining with incomplete information. We proposed a decision model that helps agents to successfully bargain by performing indirect negotiation and learning the opponent’s model. Methodologically the paper casts heuristically-motivated bargaining of a self-interested independent player into a framework of Bayesian learning and Markov decision processes. The special form of the reward implicitly motivates the players to negotiate indirectly, via closed-loop interaction. We illustrate the approach by applying our model to the Nash demand game, which is an abstract model of bargaining. The results indicate that the established negotiation: i) leads to coordinating players’ actions; ii) results in maximising success rate of the game and iii) brings more individual profit to the players.Keywords
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Funding Information
- Grant (LTC18075)
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