Truth in the Garden of Forking Paths
- 14 August 2008
- book chapter
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 81-102
Abstract
Many philosophers have supposed that if possible worlds overlap and branch (as opposed to having qualitatively identical pasts and then ‘diverging’), our common-sense talk about the future is deeply misguided. Some of them plump for common sense, others for branching. This chapter argues that the dilemma is a false one. It is possible to develop a semantics for tense and the historical modalities that vindicate common-sense talk about the future, actuality, and historical possibility, even if there is branching. However, this can only be done in a semantic framework that relativizes truth to contexts of assessment.Keywords
This publication has 10 references indexed in Scilit:
- XIV*-MAKING SENSE OF RELATIVE TRUTHProceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2005
- Logical Commitment and Semantic Indeterminacy: A Reply to WilliamsonLinguistics and Philosophy, 2004
- Future Contingents and Relative TruthThe Philosophical Quarterly, 2003
- Tense, Modality, and Semantic ValuesPhilosophical Perspectives, 2003
- Timothy Williamson, Vagueness: London and New York: 1994Linguistics and Philosophy, 1998
- Indeterminism and the Thin Red LinePhilosophical Perspectives, 1994
- Truth, belief, and vaguenessJournal of Philosophical Logic, 1976
- General semanticsSynthese, 1970
- Indeterminist time and truth‐value gaps1Theoria, 1970
- Anselm and ActualityNoûs, 1970