Deterministic evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations
- 10 July 2009
- journal article
- research article
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review E
- Vol. 80 (1) , 011909
Abstract
Evolutionary game dynamics describes the spreading of successful strategies in a population of reproducing individuals. Typically, the microscopic definition of strategy spreading is stochastic such that the dynamics becomes deterministic only in infinitely large populations. Here, we present a microscopic birth-death process that has a fully deterministic strong selection limit in well-mixed populations of any size. Additionally, under weak selection, from this process the frequency-dependent Moran process is recovered. This makes it a natural extension of the usual evolutionary dynamics under weak selection. We find simple expressions for the fixation probabilities and average fixation times of the process in evolutionary games with two players and two strategies. For cyclic games with two players and three strategies, we show that the resulting deterministic dynamics crucially depends on the initial condition in a nontrivial way.Keywords
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